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Extradition and the Death Penalty
Exception in Canada: Resolving the
Ng and Kindler Cases
SHARON

I.

A. WILLIAMS*

INTRODUCTION

Extradition law performs two distinct functions. In one respect,
extradition law is a complex compendium of rules that assists states in
returning fugitives to their criminal justice systems. This characterization views the extradition law and process as one of mutual assistance in criminal matters between states.' In another respect,
extradition law provides the individual fugitive with protection
through legal safeguards that ultimately may prevent his or her return
to the requesting state.
The Kindler 2 and Ng 3 cases bring the two competing functions
of extradition law and process squarely into focus. Both cases address
important questions concerning the appropriateness of extraditing
from Canada, which abolished the death penalty in 1976, to the
United States, a country in which thirty-seven states allow capital
punishment. As the majority of Canada's extradition requests come
from the United States, this question of the right balance between international cooperation and human rights issues is of the utmost
importance.
The bases for the extradition requests in Kindler and Ng provide
an understanding of the dilemma facing Canada in extradition cases
where the fugitive is subject to the death penalty. John Joseph Kindler was convicted in Pennsylvania, in 1983, of first degree murder,
criminal conspiracy, and kidnapping. The jury recommended the
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Canada.
1. Reciprocity is a key issue with states having a mutuality of obligations. This is seen
in the basic precept of extradition law that there be a threshold requirement of double criminality. As to reciprocity, see M.C. BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 325 (1987); M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 314 (1974).

2. United States v. Kindler, 22 C.C.C.3d 90 (Qui S.C. 1985); Kindler v. Crosbie, [1987]
2 F.C. 145 (F.C.T.D); Kindler v. Crosbie, [1989] 2 F.C. 492 (F.C.A.).
3. United States v. Ng, 93 A.R. 204 (Q.B. 1988); United States v. Ng, 97 A.R. 241 (C.A.
1989).
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death penalty. Because Kindler escaped from custody in September
1984, his sentence was never formally imposed. Kindler was arrested
in Canada in 1985. Charles Chitat Ng was accused in California of
twelve counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, two counts
of conspiracy to commit murder, three counts of kidnapping, and one
count of burglary, when he escaped from custody. He was apprehended in Canada in 1985.
This Article will focus on extradition based on Canada's Extradition Act. 4 Canada does not extradite unless there is a treaty in force
with the requesting state. 5 Canada has the discretion to extradite to
the United States in the Kindler and Ng cases. Alternatively, Canada
may refuse to extradite unless competent authorities in the United
States give assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, or if
imposed, will not be carried out. In many respects, this puts Canada
on the horns of a dilemma: if assurances are not given, what are Canada's options? This Article addresses these options, using Kindler and
Ng as the central cases in which Canadian courts have examined this
issue.
Canada's procedure in extradition cases differs from that of the
United States. Once the extradition judge, habeas corpus judge, court
of appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada have committed or upheld the committal of a fugitive for surrender, it is up to the Minister
of Justice to decide whether surrender is appropriate. The Minister's
decision may then be reviewed further by the courts if there are
grounds to do so. The Kindler and Ng cases demonstrate the judicial
and ministerial path of extradition in Canada. They are also notable
4. R.S.C. ch. E-23 (1985).
5. However, Canada will extradite without a treaty in two limited circumstances. One
of these circumstances is when there is a special agreement with a foreign state pursuant to
part II of the Extradition Act. Special agreements are far more limited than extradition treaties. For example, they apply only to crimes committed after the agreement has entered into
force, whereas extradition treaties are, unless they provide expressly to the contrary, retrospective, as well as prospective, and contain a more detailed schedule of offenses. For an example
of an express treaty limit on retrospectivity, see Extradition Agreement, Mar. 10, 1967, Canada-Israel, 1969 Can. T.S. No. 25, 722 U.N.T.S. 270. Canada entered into this type of special
agreement for the first time with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1974. However, this was
superseded by a later treaty. See Extradition Agreement, Sept. 30, 1979, Canada-West Germany, 1979 Can. T.S. No. 18. Note that the parties to this treaty will likely amend it in the
near future to reflect German unification. In 1979, a part II agreement was signed with Brazil
and, in 1985, with India. As of 1987, Canada has an extradition treaty with India.
The other limited circumstance in which Canada will extradite in the absence of a treaty
is where the rendition of fugitives to or from the Commonwealth under the Fugitive Offenders
Act is concerned. See Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 (1985).
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for their examination of the death penalty and judicial review of the
Minister of Justice's decision to extradite.
In order to put the Kindler and Ng cases into perspective, this
Article first discusses the differences between treaty interpretation and
statutory interpretation in the death penalty area and how this impacts on the death penalty issue. Secondly, in looking at the constitutional rights of the fugitive under Canadian law, this Article makes a
detailed reference to a recent decision of the European Court of
Human Rights, which has undoubted comparative and persuasive significance for Kindler and Ng. This Article then surveys the respective
roles of the Minister of Justice and the judiciary in extradition matters
in Canada, placing emphasis on the reviewability of the Minister's
decision to extradite without seeking assurances in death penalty
cases. Next, this Article considers the vital question of whether Canadian constitutional guarantees extend to penalties to be executed in a
foreign sovereign state. It also considers whether the guarantees
would be violated by extraditing in a death penalty case. Finally, this
Article summarizes the approaches that Canada can take if the
Supreme Court of Canada should hold that extradition cannot take
place in the absence of assurances.
II.

TREATY INTERPRETATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

In dealing with human rights, the death sentence, and Canadian
extradition, it is important to note the differences in approach between interpretation of Canada's extradition treaties and the Extradition Act. These differences become apparent upon consideration of
extradition's role in the overall scheme of law. From a purely international perspective, extradition is a treaty matter bearing directly on
the rights and duties of states, thus, interstate cooperation is emphasized. From a domestic law perspective, extradition is viewed as part
of the criminal process, and thus may be interpreted in a manner that
emphasizes the fugitive's rights.
The fundamental rule of interpretation from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 6 is to interpret treaties literally according

to the ordinary meaning of the words used in the text.7 Treaties must
6. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27, (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (instrument of
accession deposited by Canada, October 14, 1970, pursuant to Order in Council, P.C. 19791339, entered into force January 27, 1980).
7. See id. art. 30.
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also be interpreted in good faith (pacta sunt servanda)8 "which is at
once psychological and ethical, requiring adherence to ordinary
meaning and context." 9 A treaty must be interpreted in a manner
that is calculated to give it effect and content, rather than to deprive it
of meaning. 10
Applying these rules to extradition treaties, the courts in Canada
and the United Kingdom have liberally interpreted such agreements
in order to give effect to the treaty. As G.V. La Forest stated in Extradition to and from Canada,I I "treaties should receive a fair and
liberal meaning and ...in extradition matters the ordinary technical
rules of criminal law should apply to a limited extent."' 2 In Canada
v. Schmidt, 13 Justice La Forest further stated:
I would add that the lessons of history should not be overlooked.
Sir Edward Clarke instructs us that in the early 19th century the
English judges, by strict and narrow interpretation, almost completely nullified the operation of the few extradition treaties then in
existence.... Following the enactment of the British Extradition
Act, 1870, . . . upon which ours is modelled, this approach was
reversed. The present system of extradition works because courts
give the treaties a fair and liberal interpretation with a view to fulfilling Canada's obligations, reducing the technicalities of criminal
law to a minimum and trusting the courts in the foreign country to
14
give the fugitive a fair trial ....
Under section 52 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' 5 ("Charter"), should a treaty provision, as implemented into
Canadian law by the Extradition Act, violate a Charter right and not
be saved by section 1 of the Charter, the provision will be struck down
6
as would domestic legislation itself.'
8. Id. art. 26.
9. See S.A. WILLIAMS & A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (2d ed. 1987).
10. Id.; see also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J.C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION

156 (1967).
G.V. LA FOREST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA (2d ed. 1977).
12. Id. at 57.
13. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
14. Id. at 524 (citations omitted).

OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

11.

15. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. §§ 1-34 (1982) (enacted by the Canada Act, 1982
(U.K.) c. 11, and proclaimed into force Apr. 17, 1982) [hereinafter Charter].
16. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 518 (La Forest, J.) ("There can be no doubt that the
actions undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject
to scrutiny under the Charter .... ); see also id. at 521-22 (referring to Operation Dismantle
Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441).
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In the United States, Professor Bassiouni has stated that:
[w]here a provision is capable of two interpretations, either of
which would comport with the other terms of the treaty, the judiciary will choose the construction which is more liberal and would
permit the relator's extradition, because the purpose of the treaty is
17
to facilitate extradition treaties between the parties to the treaty.

Further, he has written that "[a]t times the judiciary will interpret
terms beyond their actual meaning to encompass their spirit and intent ....

18

This liberal approach of interpreting extradition treaties may be
labelled "cooperative," as it responds to the mutual interests of states
in having a flexible extradition process and reciprocal cooperation.' 9
Halsbury's Laws of England explains the liberal approach this way:
"The words used in such [extradition] treaties are to be given their
ordinary international meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike,
and not a particular meaning which they may have attracted in certain branches of activity in England." 20
In Belgium v. Postlewaite,21 Lord Bridge addressed this issue,

stating: "In my judgment those treaties ought to receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they should receive their
true construction according to their language, object and intent. '22
Lord Bridge then went on to hold that "the court should not interpret
any extradition treaty, unless so constrained by the language, in a way
which would 'hinder the working and narrow the operation of most
salutary international arrangements.' "23
Lord Bridge referred to a statement by Chief Justice Lord
17.

M.C. BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND

PRACTICE 88 (1987) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554

(8th Cir. 1984); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980); Matter of Sindona, 584 F.
Supp. 1437, 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
18. M.C. BASSbOUNI, supra note 17, at 89 (referring to L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 952-53 (8th ed. 1955)). This rule was applied in Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981).
19. See Warbrick, The Criminal JusticeAct 1988: (1) the New Law on Extradition, CRIM.
L. REv. 4, 5 n.19 (1989); Bozano v. France, 111 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987) (Schermers, J.,
dissenting).
20. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 88, 216 (4th ed. 1977) (citing Ex Parte Ecke,
reprinted in [1974] CRiM. L. REP. 102).
21. [1987] 2 All E.R. 985 (H.L.). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recently
referred to this case as good authority for the liberal interpretation principle in United States v.
Bowe, [1989] 3 All E.R. 315, 326.
22. [1987] 2 All E.R. at 991.
23. Id. (quoting In re Arton (No. 2), [1986] 1 Q.B. 509, 517).
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Widgery in Ex parte Beese, 24 in which Lord Widgery held that because an extradition treaty is a contract between two sovereign states,
it should be construed as if it were a domestic statute. 2 - However, in
applying that principle, Lord Bridge held that state parties to bilateral
extradition treaties enter into reciprocal rights and duties for the purpose of bringing to justice those who have committed grave crimes.
Therefore, to "apply to extradition treaties the strict canons appropriate to the construction of domestic legislation would often tend to
defeat rather than to serve this purpose."' 2 6 Thus, in Postlewaite, Lord
Bridge indicated that courts should look for the underlying intention
27
of the contracting parties when interpreting a treaty provision.
This emphasis on interstate cooperation in interpreting treaties
may be seen as conflicting with the protective function of extradition
law. One commentator has suggested that:
[t]he conflict between the cooperative and protective functions of
extradition law creates a certain tension, something exacerbated by
the different views among states about the exact place of extradition in the criminal process. To the extent that extradition is seen
[as] simply part of the process of gaining custody of the fugitive,
the protections appropriate are relatively slight and the matter may
28
be regarded as administrative rather than judicial.
The protective side of extradition procedure clearly emphasizes
the penal law aspects of extradition and provides protective safeguards for the fugitive. 29 In contrast, Postlewaite illustrates a preference for the cooperative approach. This preference is also seen in
30
other fairly recent extradition cases dealing with evidentiary issues,
3' and the double criminality rule. 32
the political offense exception,
24. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 969.
25. See Postlewaite, [1987] 2 All E.R. at 991 (quoting Ex Parte Beese, [1973] 1 W.L.R.
969, 973).
26. Id. at 992.
27. See id.
28. Warbrick, supra note 19, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
29. For a recent case in which the European Court of Human Rights held that deportation from France to Switzerland in certain circumstances involved a violation of article 5(l)(O
of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Bozano v. France, 111 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1987).
30. See, e.g., Exparte Rees, [1986] 2 All E.R. 321 (H.L.); In re Muir, T.L.R. (Dec. 11,

1987).
31. See, e.g., Ex parte Cheng, [1973] 2 All E.R. 204 (H.L.); Keane v. Governor of
Brixton Prison [1971] 1 All E.R. 1163.

32. See, e.g., Denmark v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. 81; United States v. McCaffery,
[1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
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It appears that the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States generally emphasize the cooperative intent of state
parties to extradition treaties when interpreting treaty provisions.
However, when a domestic statute is in question, the courts are more
protective. When the courts interpret extradition legislation, such as
the Extradition Act, they stress the penal aspects. When the courts
33
find ambiguities, they seem to construe them in favor of the fugitive.
3
4
For example, in Ex parte Cheng, Lord Simon stated that "the positive powers [to extradite] under the Act should be given a restrictive
construction and the exceptions from those positive powers a liberal
construction. 3 5 He further stated that "[s]ince the common law, as
so often, favours the freedom of the individual, the rules enjoining
strict construction of a penal statute or of a provision in derogation of
liberty merely reinforce the presumptions against change in the com' 36
mon law."
It must be reemphasized that should a treaty obligation or the
Extradition Act itself violate a Charter right, the offending article or
section will have no force or effect, unless it falls within the reasonableness limitation of section 1. It is fundamental that international
treaty expediency not take precedence over a Charter right.

III.

THE DEATH SENTENCE EXCEPTION AND THE
FUGITIVE IN CANADA

Several of Canada's extradition treaties, including the 1976 treaty
with the United States 37 and those with Austria, 38 Israel, 39 Germany,40 and Sweden,41 provide that where an extraditable offense is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting state, and the
laws of the requested state do not allow such punishment for that
33.

See, e.g., In re Aronson, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 436, 466; see also Extradition Act, 1989, 17
ch. 33, 33/2.
34. [1973] 2 All E.R. 204 (H.L.).
35. Id. at 217.
36. Id.
37. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983,
T.I.A.S. No. 8237 [hereinafter United States-Canada Extradition Treaty]. Cf European Convention on Extradition, Nov. 29, 1965, art. II, 597 U.N.T.S. 338. The Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1990) recently recommended that the Model Treaty on Extradition likewise contain such an article.
38. Extradition Agreement, Canada-Austria, 1969 Can. T.S. No. 24.
39. Extradition Agreement, Mar. 10, 1967, Canada-Israel, 1969 Can. T.S. No. 25, 722
U.N.T.S. 270.
40. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
41. Extradition Agreement, Canada-Sweden, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 8.
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES (ANNOTATED),
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offense, the requested state may refuse extradition unless the requesting state provides sufficient assurances that the death penalty shall not
be imposed, or if imposed, shall not be carried out.
The Extradition Act does not deal with the question of penalties.
However, two observations are pertinent. First, section 3 of the Extradition Act provides that if any sections of the Act conflict with the
articles of one of Canada's extradition treaties, the treaty will prevail. 42 This is an exception to the usual rule in Canada that the domestic statute will take precedence. However, as was indicated
previously, should such treaty provisions run counter to the individual guarantees provided by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 43 the
Charter provisions will prevail."4
The second observation is that even though the Act does not specifically address the Minister of Justice's. refusal to extradite on the
ground that a requesting state may impose the death penalty, it is still
important to note that a broad interpretation of the specialty rule
would encompass this question. A broad interpretation would also
provide a ground upon which the fugitive and the requested state
could challenge an extradition agreed to on the basis of assurances
that the death penalty would not be carried out. Bassiouni suggests
that if the requested state wishes to impose the condition, it must explicitly indicate so when granting the extradition request. 45 If it does
not do so, the requesting state may consider it only as "a recommendation for leniency." 46 Bassiouni concludes that "[iut is not yet well
established if such a condition is binding on the requesting state, as it
may be considered an infringement of its sovereignty. However, if the
requesting state accepts the condition, it would become part of the
' '47
principle of specialty.
A full discussion of the specialty rule is not possible within the
confines of this Article, but it must be emphasized that the specialty
rule is central to the extradition process, as it protects the fugitive
from unexpected charges and, it is submitted, unexpected penalties
42.
43.

Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23, § 3 (1985).
Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. §§ 1-34 (1982).

44. Id. § 52.
45.

M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND UNITED STATES LAW AND

PRACTICE 366 (1987) (citing In re Cort6s, [1934] A.D. 356 (Camara Federal de la Capital,
Argentina)).
46. Id. (citing In re Oberbichler, [1934] 7 A.D. 354 (Corte cass., Italy)).
47. Id.
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once extradited. 48 It also protects the requested state from abuse of
49
its extradition processes.

The issue of the death penalty exception is not only of academic
interest to Canada. Canada and the United States have a long-standing extradition basis. The majority of the extradition requests directed to Canada come from the United States, a country in which
many states have not abolished the death penalty. Thus, Canada has

an interest in the efficacy of the extradition process and in continued
cooperation in criminal matters, including extradition. Nevertheless,
the human rights protections of fugitives detained in Canada cannot
be denied. Canada therefore faces the difficult task of striking the
appropriate balance between cooperation with the United States and
protection of the fugitives' rights.
The following section will analyze whether the Minister of Justice's decision to extradite without sufficient assurances can be
overruled.
IV.

EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
SECTIONS

7

AND

12

A

VIOLATION OF

OF THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS?

The heart of this debate on extradition centers on whether sections 7 and 12 of the Charter apply to cases in which adverse consequences will result to the extradited individual because of punishment
imposed in the requesting state. There are two main issues that must
be addressed. The first issue is the intraterritorial or extraterritorial
scope of the Charter in relation to such cases. The second issue consists of two parts: 1) Is a decision of the Minister of Justice to extra48. The rule requires that once the requested state surrenders the fugitive, the requesting
state may only prosecute him or her for the offense for which extradition was granted, unless
the fugitive has had a reasonable opportunity to leave the requesting state. This rule may be
found in domestic legislation such as section 33 of the Extradition Act or in bilateral or multilateral extradition treaties. It is, however, a matter of debate whether it can be classified as a
rule of customary international law, and may thus be raised by the fugitive even where a
statutory or treaty provision is absent. In support of this view, see Hart & Poncet, Rapport sur
le principede la specialitden matiired'extradition, REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROrr PtNAL
(forthcoming). Also, note the view expressed by Justice La Forest in Parisien v. The Queen,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 950, 957, where he stated that "this is seen by some as a customary rule of
international law, but it seems to me to arise out of a proper construction of the treaty." See
also Feller, Reflections on the Nature of the Specialty Principlein Extradition Relations, 12 ISR.
L. REv. 466, 487.
49. As to both the fugitive and the requested state being beneficiaries of this rule, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 477(b)(1987).
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dite to a state which retains the death penalty a violation of section 12
of the Charter in that the fugitive will be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment? 2) If extradition is not viewed as directly contrary to section 12, will section 7 still be violated to the
extent that extradition in such circumstances will deprive the fugitive
of the right to life, liberty, and security of the person? Thus, the basic
question here is whether the decision to extradite conforms to the
principles of fundamental justice.
In probing these questions, it will be useful to first analyze the
recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v.
United Kingdom 50 and its holding on a parallel question.
A.

The Impact of the Soering Case

Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights based on the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 5 ("European Convention") and its relevant protocols are not binding on Canada because, as a non-European
country, Canada is not and cannot be a member of the Council of
Europe under its current constitution. 52 However, since the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms utilizes, in part, the language of the
European Convention, the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights most certainly have persuasive value in Canada. Already, Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have had occasion to refer to the Convention and the European Court's decisions.
Additionally, on August 19, 1976, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 53 and First Optional Protocol5 4 went into
force in Canada. Likewise, Canadian courts have not been reticent in
citing applicable Covenant articles to assist them in interpreting similar language in Charter cases. 55
50. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
51. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
52. Member states are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It has
been suggested that several Eastern European states are now in the process of applying to
become parties to the Convention, as a pre-condition for membership in the Council of Europe. See Breitenmoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 845 n.2 (1990). The Council of Europe restricts its membership to those states that
are committed to the rule of law and the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms. Id.
53. 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47.
54. Id.
55. See S.A. WILLIAMS & A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, supra note 9, at 34-35; Claydon, The
InternationalLaw of Human Rights and CanadianCourts, Proceedings of the 1981 Conference
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The recent unanimous judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom 56 is therefore of great
importance. Soering involved an extradition request by the United
States to the United Kingdom for the fugitive Jens Soering, on
charges of capital murder. 57 Following his committal for surrender
by the extradition judge, Soering applied for a writ of habeas corpus
and for leave to apply for judicial review.5 8 Both applications were
refused by the Divisional Court.5 9 The case eventually went to the
European Court of Human Rights, and the judgment rendered on
July 7, 1989, will, as two commentators have aptly stated, "have some
accelerating effect on the future discussion of extradition law and the
value of human rights in such proceedings. . .."60
1. The Facts of the Soering Case
Jens Soering, a German national, was born on August 1, 1966.61
The United States' extradition request stemmed from two murders
committed in Virginia in March 1985.62 The victims, William and
Nancy Haysom, died from multiple and massive slash wounds to the
neck, throat, and body. 63 They were the parents of Jens Soering's
girlfriend, Elizabeth Haysom, a Canadian citizen. 64 Both Soering and
Elizabeth Haysom were students at the University of Virginia. 65 In
October 1985, they disappeared from Virginia, but were arrested in
April 1986, in England, for check fraud. 6
In June 1986, a police investigator from Virginia interviewed
Soering in England. 6 7 The investigator recorded in a sworn affidavit
that Soering had admitted the killings. 68 His motive was that he was
of the C.C.I.L. 2; Cohen & Bayefsky, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
Public International Law, 61 CAN. B. REV. 265 (1983); Green, The Canadian Charter of
Rights and InternationalLaw, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1982).
56. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). See also the affirmation of Soering in The Netherlands v. Short, translated from the Dutch and reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1375 (Neth. HR 1990).
57. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13.
58.. Id 22.
59. Id.
60. Breitenmoser & Wilms, supra note 52, at 847; see also Lillich, The Soering Case, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 141 (1991).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id. 12.
Id.
Id
Id.
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id. 13.
Id

11.

12.
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in love with Elizabeth Haysom, but her parents were opposed to the
relationship.69 The United States requested the extradition of Soering
and Elizabeth Haysom in August 1986.70 Soering was charged with
two counts of capital murder and two counts of the separate noncapital murders of the parents. 7 1 The United Kingdom surrendered
Elizabeth Haysom to the United States in May 1987.72 In August
1987, she pleaded guilty as an accessory to the murder of her parents
73
and was sentenced to ninety years imprisonment.
Soering was arrested on September 12, 1987, following the issue
of a warrant by a magistrate at Bow Street Magistrate's Court. 74 The
British Embassy in Washington requested an assurance from United
States authorities that the death penalty would not be utilized, based
on article IV of the Extradition Treaty. 75 The request read as follows:
Because the death penalty has been abolished in Great Britain,
the Embassy has been instructed to seek an assurance, in accordance with the terms of... the Extradition Treaty, that, in the event
of Mr. Soering being surrendered and convicted of the crimes for
which he has been indicted ... , the death penalty, if imposed, will
not be carried out.
Should it not be possible on constitutional grounds for the
United States government to give such an assurance, the United
Kingdom authorities ask that the United States government undertake to recommend to the appropriate authorities that the death
penalty should not be imposed or, if imposed, should not be
6
executed.

7

The Federal Republic of Germany, the state of Soering's nationality,
also requested his extradition. 77 In the United Kingdom, the Director
69. d
70. Id. 114. The United States made its requests under the Extradition Treaty of June 8,
1972, between the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230, T.I.A.S. No.
8468.
71. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 12.
72. Id. 113.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id. This article is drafted in terms similar to article 6 of the United States-Canada
Extradition Treaty.
76. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 15.
77. Id. 16. It should be noted that most civil law states use the nationality basis of
criminal jurisdiction extensively. See Castel & Williams, The Extradition of CanadianCitizens
and Sections 1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 263 (1987).
Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom is governed by the 1872 Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, as amended by an
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of Public Prosecutions advised the Secretary of State that, although
the German request showed that German courts had jurisdiction over
the crime, the evidence submitted did not amount to a prima facie
case, 7 8 and an extradition magistrate in the United Kingdom therefore would not commit the fugitive for surrender to Germany.7 9 The
German government's only evidence was the admissions made by
Soering to a German prosecutor who interviewed Soering in a British
prison.8 0 In a letter to the Director of the United States Justice Department Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, the Attorney of Bedford County, Virginia, wrote that witnesses from the
United States could not be compelled to appear in a German criminal
court. 8 1 Accordingly, the United States concluded that the British
should give preference to its request, rather than the German
82
request.
The United Kingdom informed the Federal Republic of Germany on May 20, 1987 that, as it had received the United States'
request first, and because prima facie evidence supported the United
States' request, the court would continue to consider that request in
the usual way. 83 The United Kingdom also stressed that surrender to
the United States would be conditioned on its providing satisfactory
assurances regarding the death penalty.8 Subsequently, the Attorney
of Bedford County transmitted an affidavit to the United Kingdom
under the cover of a diplomatic note, which stated:
I hereby certify that should Jens Soering be convicted of the offence of capital murder as charged in Bedford County, Virginia...
a representation will be made in the name of the United Kingdom
to the judge at the time of sentencing that it is the wish of the
United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed or
Agreement of 1960 and an Exchange of Notes of 1978. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.

31.

These agreements are incorporated into United Kingdom law by Orders in Council (the Federal Republic of Germany (Extradition) Order 1960, S.I. 1960/1375 and the Federal Republic

of Germany (Extradition) (Amendment) Order 1978, S.I. 1978/1403). See id.
78.

Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at

82.
83.
84.

Id.
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id.

16. Note that the test for a prima facie case is

"whether, if the evidence before the Magistrate stood alone at the trial, a reasonable jury properly directed could accept it and find a verdict of guilty." See id. 32 (quoting Schtraks v.
Israel, [1964] A.C. 556).
79. Id 16.
80. Id.
81. Id. 1117.
19.
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carried out. 85

This assurance appears to address only the second paragraph of the
United Kingdom's request for assurances.
2.

The Court Proceedings in the United Kingdom

During the committal proceedings, which took place on June 16,
1987, at the Bow Street Magistrates' Court, 86 the Chief Magistrate
committed Soering to await the Secretary of State's order for extradition to the United States. 87 Soering subsequently applied to the Divisional Court for a writ of habeas corpus and for leave to apply for
judicial review. 8 8 Although the Divisional Court refused both applications,8 9 the interim proceedings merit further consideration.
In support of his application for judicial review, Soering argued
that the United States' assurances concerning the death penalty were
worthless and that no reasonable Secretary of State could have regarded them as satisfying article IV of the Extradition Treaty. 90 Lord
Lloyd agreed with Soering that "the assurance leaves something to be
desired." 91 He further stated:
Article IV of the Treaty contemplates an assurance that the death
penalty will not be carried out. That must presumably mean an
assurance by or on behalf of the Executive Branch of Government,
which in this case would be the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The certificate sworn by Mr. Updike, far from being an
assurance on behalf of the Executive, is nothing more than an undertaking to make representations on behalf of the United Kingdom to the judge. I cannot believe
that this is what was intended
92
when the Treaty was signed.
Lord Lloyd therefore did not give much weight to the assurance. He
stated, however, that on account of the federal nature of the United
States, it might have been difficult to get more.93 He refused to grant
review because the claim was premature; the Secretary of State had
85.

Id.

20. The Attorney of Bedford County repeated this assurance in a subsequent

affidavit. Id.

86. Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

21.

Id.
Soeing, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.

1 22.

1 22.
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not yet decided whether the assurance was satisfactory.9 4 This position is in keeping with the Canadian decisions in United States v. Kindler 95 and United States v. Ng, 96 in which the courts refused to grant
review until an administrative decision had been made.
On June 30, 1988, the House of Lords rejected Soering's petition
for leave to appeal.9 7 Following the Secretary of State's rejection of
the fugitive's request that he exercise his discretion not to make the
order for surrender, Soering was ordered surrendered to the United
States.98 Instead of seeking review of the Secretary of State's administrative decision, 99 Soering turned to the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg.100
94. Id.
95. 22 C.C.C.3d
(F.C.A.).
96. 93 A.R. 204
97. Soering, 161
98. Id. 1 24.
99. In a judicial

90 (Qu6. S.C. 1985); [1987] 2 F.C. 145 (F.C.T.D.); [1989] 2 F.C. 492
(Q.B. 1988); 97 A.R. 241 (1989) (C.A. 1989).
Eur. Ct. H.R. 23.
review proceeding before a British Court, Soering could have asked for

review of the decision to extradite on the grounds that it was tainted with illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service, [1984] 3 All E.R. 935, 937 (C.A.). In determining what constituted "irrationality,"
the so-called "Wednesbury principles" of reasonableness would have been used. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A.). The test
in an extradition case is whether "no reasonable Secretary of State could have made an order
for return in the circumstances." Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35. This could be viewed from
the perspective of acceptance of the assurance and whether there was a serious risk of inhuman
or degrading treatment if returned. See id.
According to Ex parte Bugdaycay, [1987] 1 All E.R. 940, which dealt with a refusal to
grant asylum, courts will strictly apply the principles of reasonableness in cases where an applicant's life is at risk.
[T]he court must.., be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the most
rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity
of the issue which the decision determines. The most fundamental of all human
rights is the individual's right to life and, when an administrative decision under
challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of the
decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.
[1987] 1 All E.R. 940, 952. In Ex parte Bugdaycay, Lord Templeman added, "[iun my opinion
where the result of a flawed decision may imperil life or liberty a special responsibility lies on
the court in the examination of the decision-making process." Id. at 956.
Additionally, the British courts will not review any decision of the Secretary of State
merely because he or she failed to consider the question of breach of the European Convention
on Human Rights. See Ex parte Kirkwood, [1984] 2 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.).
100. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. It should be noted that the United Kingdom has
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, but has not enacted implementing legislation. Warbrick, Reasonablenessand the Decision to Extradite: In re Kirkwood, 1984 PuB. L.
539, 543 (stating that the argument that a treaty has no effect in the domestic legal system until
implemented "should not carry the same weight in relation to assessing an exercise of a ministerial power"). But see Malone v. Commissioner of Police, [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, 638 (C.D.)
(orthodox view that a ratified but nonimplemented treaty is not part of the domestic law).
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The Application Before the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights took jurisdiction over the
case following an application by Soering to the European Commission
on Human Rights. 10 1 The Commission indicated that the United
Kingdom could not extradite Soering until the Commission had examined the application and the case had been referred to the European Court of Human Rights. 10 2 The Commission brought the case
before the court on January 25, 1989.103 The purpose of the Commission's request and the two subsequent governmental applications of
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany was to
obtain a decision as to whether the United Kingdom breached its obli°4
gations under articles 3, 6, and 13 of the European Convention.
The court unanimously held that, due to the particular circumstances of Soering's case, there would be a violation of article 3 if the
decision to extradite to the United States was implemented. Additionally, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint under article 6.3(c) and no violation under article 13.105
101. Application no. 14038/88 of July 8, 1988, pursuant to art. 25 of the Convention.
102. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 4. The court did this in accordance with Rule
36 of the Court's Rules of Procedure. Id
103. Id.
1. The case was also brought before the Court by the United Kingdom on
January 30, 1989, and by the Federal Republic of Germany on February 3, 1989. Id.
104. Id Pursuant to Rule 33 section 3(d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that
he wished to take part in the proceedings before the court. Id. 2. Articles 3, 6, and 13
provide, respectively:
Article 3
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
Article 6
(3)

Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require ....
Article 13
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
European Convention, supra note 51.
105. It should be noted that the Commission's Report annexed to the judgment indicates
that the Commission believed there was a breach of article 13 (7-4 vote), but no breach of
article 3 (6-5 vote) or article 6.3(c) (unanimous). Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. With respect
to the vote on article 3, the Commission declined to find that a period of years on death row,
caused by the accused's right to pursue several avenues of appeal, attained the degree of severity required. This Article will discuss the court's reasoning in the sections that follow, as it is
currently of great comparative interest to Canada.
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Applicability of Sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charterof
Rights in Extradition Cases

1. Respective Roles of the Minister of Justice and the Judiciary
To date, Canadian courts have taken the view that the Minister
of Justice has the discretion to deny extradition in cases where the
death penalty is a possibility. There is an essential difference between
an extradition judge's committal for surrender and the Minister of
Justice's decision to surrender. First, the extradition judge can only
receive evidence relevant to his or her function under the Extradition
Act. 0 6 In Argentina v. Mellino,10 7 Justice La Forest stated that "the
sole purpose of an extradition hearing is to ensure that the evidence
establishes a prima facie case that the extradition crime has been committed."1 0 8 Justice La Forest also stressed that the extradition judge
and hearing play a modest role in the overall process, barring statutory or treaty exceptions.1°9
Second, neither the Extradition Act, nor a treaty, authorizes the
extradition judge to adjudicate or hear evidence on the death penalty
issue. This is to be contrasted with the extradition judge's authority
to take evidence concerning the political offense exception pursuant to
section 15 of the Extradition Act." 0 In United States v. Ng,"' the
Alberta Court of Appeal recently held that the death sentence could
be distinguished from the political offense exception because political
offense "evidence is ... of a much different character than evidence
which goes to the exercise of a ministerial discretion and the inclusion
of a specific empowering provision militates strongly against our implying one."' " 2 Earlier, in United States v. Kindler,"13 the court similarly held that any question of non-extradition by reason of the death
4
penalty is to be decided by the Minister of Justice."
These decisions interpreting the Extradition Act and bilateral
106. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23, § 18 (1985).
107. 33 C.C.C.3d 334, 349 (1987) (S.C.C.) (extradition case dealing not with the death
penalty, but with section 11 of the Charter).
108. Id.
109. See id.; see also Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 519.
110. See Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23, § 15 (1985).
111. 97 A.R. 241 (C.A. 1989) (upholding the extradition judge's decision).
112. Id. at 243.
113. 22 C.C.C.3d 90 (QuE. S.C. 1985). See also Bouthillier v. United States, No. 500-3600813 (Qui S.C. Feb. 1, 1991), a case in which Justice Pinard held that a decision as to
whether a minimum punishment of imprisonment was cruel and unusual was within the province of the executive, subject to judicial review.
114. See United States v. Kindler, 22 C.C.C.3d 90 (Qu6 S.C. 1985).
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treaty provisions are correct. Under the Canadian system, the judiciary and the executive serve distinct functions. The extradition judge's
role is to ascertain whether all of the extradition requirements are
satisfied, such as the crime being extraditable, double criminality, and
sufficiency of evidence. After the Minister of Justice receives an extradition judge's decision to commit for surrender, he or she makes
the determination about extraditing the fugitive.' 15 In exercising his
or her discretion to extradite, the Minister may take into account a
wide variety of matters. Thus, at the ministerial stage, the fugitive
may present to the Minister evidence on the death penalty issue in the
1 16
form of oral and written argument.
Following a decision by the Minister of Justice to extradite with
or without assurances concerning the death penalty, a fugitive may
seek judicial review. 117 This gives the fugitive a protracted period between the initial extradition judge's committal for surrender and review of the Minister of Justice's decision by the Federal Court, Trial
Division, Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada. s
A long-awaited decision on the issue of extradition and the death
penalty appears to be forthcoming, as the Governor in Council has
recently referred this issue to the Supreme Court of Canada. 1 9 The
questions presented to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and
consideration are: 1) Would the surrender by Canada of an extradition fugitive to the United States, to stand trial for willful or deliberate murder for which the penalty upon conviction may be death,
constitute a breach of the fugitive's rights guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 2) Did the Minister of Justice, in deciding pursuant to article 6 of the United States-Canada Extradition
Treaty to surrender the fugitive Ng without seeking assurances from
the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed on Ng
or, if imposed, that it would not be executed, commit any of the errors
of law and jurisdiction alleged by the extraditee? 120
115. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23, § 25 (1985).
116. In Kindler, the Minister of Justice declined to hear viva voce evidence by Kindler
himself, because he thought that it would be improper for a Minister of Justice to reconsider a
fugitive's credibility.
117. See Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
118. New legislation is needed in Canada to update the Extradition Act. This must include streamlining the extradition review process and the judicial review of the Minister of
Justice's decision because there is too much duplication.
119. By Order-in-Council P.C. 1990-1082, dated June 7, 1990, promulgated pursuant to
section 53(1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. ch. S-26 (1985).
120. Id. Oral hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada took place on February 21,
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In terms of procedure, the Kindler case has gone the extradition
route. In that case, the Minister of Justice decided to surrender without seeking assurances, and Kindler sought review by the Federal
Court, Trial Division.1 2 1 The court refused to quash the Minister's
decision. 122 An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal likewise failed.
In Ng, the extradition judge committed Ng for surrender. The
Alberta Court of Appeal upheld her decision. The Minister of Justice, as in Kindler, decided to surrender without seeking assurances.
Unlike Kindler, however, Ng has not gone through the federal court
review process. The outcome of this Supreme Court of Canada case
may clarify a number of extradition matters that are currently
uncertain.
2.

Extraterritorial or Intraterritorial Application of the Charter

In deciding whether Canada may extradite Kindler and Ng, the
Supreme Court of Canada must consider whether sections 7 and 12 of
the Charter may be applied extraterritorially to conduct by other
states with the effect of prohibiting extradition, or whether their scope
is intraterritorial to Canada. If the latter perspective is taken, can
these sections prevent extradition on-the basis that, by extraditing,
Canada would allow a violation of rights that would be protected
under the Charter in Canada? To date, none of the justices on the
Supreme Court of Canada have suggested extraterritorial application.
In Canada v. Schmidt, Justice La Forest stated that "there cannot be
any doubt that the Charter does not govern the actions of a foreign
country. In particular the Charter cannot be given extraterritorial effect to govern how criminal proceedings in a foreign country are to be
conducted." 123 The crux of the matter, therefore, is deciding what
constitutes intraterritorial application.
1991. The judgment was reserved. Justice Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada has stated
two related constitutional questions:
Is s. 25 of the ExtraditionAct,. . . to the extent that it permits the Minister of Justice
to order the surrender of-a fugitive for a crime for which the fugitive may be or has
been sentenced to death in the foreign state without first obtaining assurances from
the foreign state that the death penalty will not be imposed, will not be executed,
inconsistent with ss. 7 or 12 of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms?
If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, is s. 25 of the Extradition Act,
...
a reasonable limit of the rights of a fugitive within the meaning of s. 1 of the
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, and therefore not inconsistent with the
Constitution Act, 1982?
121. Kindler v. Crosbie, [1987] 2 F.C. 145, 148-49.
122. Id. at 156-57.
123. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 518.
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The specific issue is whether Canada should apply the Charter to
extradition cases in which the death penalty exists in the requesting
state. Because Canada has abolished the death penalty, the question
is whether the imposition of the death penalty would deny the fugitive
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, or would subject
the fugitive to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in violation
of the Charter.
In Schmidt, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that "[t]he preeminence of the Constitution must be recognized ....,,124 Justice La
Forest stated that:
[Tihe treaty, the extradition hearing in this country and the exercise of the executive discretion to surrender a fugitive must all conform to the requirements of the Charter, including the principles of
fundamental justice ....
...

The real question is whether the fugitive in the circum-

stances of this case would, by virtue of her proposed extradition, be
deprived of this right in a manner that did not conform to the principles of fundamental justice.
I have no doubt either that in some circumstances the manner
in which the foreign state will deal with the fugitive on surrender,
whether that course of conduct is justifiable or not under the law of
that country, may be such that it would violate the principles of
fundamental justice to surrender an accused under those circumstances. To make the point, I need only refer to a case that arose
before the European Court on Human Rights, Altun v. Germany
. ..where it was established that prosecution in the requesting
country might involve the infliction of torture. Situations falling
far short of this may well arise where the nature of the criminal
proceedings or penalties in a foreign country sufficiently shocks the
conscience as to make a decision to surrender a fugitive for trial
there one that breaches the principles of fundamental justice enshrined in s. 7.125
The main focus in each case is whether the surrender of a fugitive
1 26
offends the basic demands of justice. In United States v. Allard,
124.

Id. at 520.

125. Id. at 520-22. For a review of Altun v. Germany, 5 E.H.R.R. 611 (1983), which dealt
with an alleged violation of article 3 of the European Convention, see Drezemczewski, Aliens
and the European Rights Convention: A General Survey, 2 NOTRE DAME INT'L & COMP. L.J.
99, 114-22 (1984).
126. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564.
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Justice La Forest stated:
[T]he only question that really arises, in this case, is whether the
respondents will face a situation in the United States such that the
mere fact of the Canadian government surrendering the respondents... constitutes an infringement of fundamental justice ....
To arrive at the conclusion that the surrender of the respondents
would violate the principles of fundamental justice, it would be
necessary to establish that the
respondents would face a situation
1 27
that is simply unacceptable.
Justice La Forest clearly set forth the Canadian Supreme Court's position when he stated in Schmidt that "the Courts must be extremely
circumspect so as to avoid interfering unduly in decisions that involve
the good faith and honour of [Canada] in its relations with other
states. In a word, judicial intervention must be limited to cases of real
1 2
substance."
In this age of easy travel, the potential for a fugitive's escape
from justice is readily apparent. It is essential that the extradition
system be effective. In Schmidt, Justice La Forest stated that what is
needed is a process of surrender that is
untrammelled by excessive technicality or fastidious demands that
foreign systems comply with [Canadian] constitutional standards.
A decision to surrender ...

cannot be faulted as fundamentally

unjust because the operation of the foreign law in the particular
circumstances has not been subjected to scrutiny to see if it will
129
conform to the standards of our system of justice.
Justice La Forest's position therefore appears to be that the Charter
should not be given extraterritorial application in extradition cases,
127.

Id. at 572. Note also his statement that the role of the courts to review the minister's

decisions must be exercised with caution. See id
128. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 523. Note also Justice La Forest's statement that "the courts
should only intervene in compelling circumstances." Id. at 528.
129. Id. at 523-24. It is interesting to note that in Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109
(1901), the United States Supreme Court reconciled guarantees under the United States Constitution with extradition to Cuba. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan stated that "those

[constitutional] provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the
United States against the laws of a foreign country." Id. at 122. See also Holmes v. Laird, 459
F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856
(D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (adding
some qualifications based upon procedures or punishment too antipathetic to the court's sense
of decency); M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 405, 417 ("The

constitutional provision against 'cruel and unusual treatment' has not been recognized as applicable to extradition proceedings but the Secretary of State can use 'Executive Discretion' to
refuse surrender of the individual or allow conditional surrender.").
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except in cases involving exceptional circumstances that shock the
130
conscience.
Justice Lamer, in a separate judgment in Schmidt, agreed with
Justice La Forest. 13 1 However, he also stated that the Charter applies
intraterritorially to extradition cases in Canada because a fugitive
qualifies as one "charged with an offence." 132 Justice Wilson concurred in the unanimous disposition of the appeal in Schmidt, but she

did not concur in Justice La Forest's reasoning. Justice Wilson saw
no question of applying the Charter extraterritorially and held that
the fugitive can plead the Charter in extradition proceedings.13 3 She
referred to HarbhajanSingh v. Ministerof Employment and Immigra-

tion 134 and stressed that it is the process in Canada that must comply
135
with fundamental justice.
Even though HarbhajanSingh concerned deportation from Canada, it is still instructive because the Supreme Court of Canada held
that section 7 applies to everyone who is physically present in Canada. Thus, in terms of extradition, this case would seem to suggest
that a fugitive is entitled to be treated in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Should a fugitive claim that the Minister
of Justice has not acted reasonably because assurances have not been

asked for or received in satisfactory form pursuant to article 6 of the
United States-Canada Extradition Treaty,1 36 Harbhajan Singh coupled with Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen 137 should proffer
130. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 522. This view is consistent with the decision of
Justice Pratte in the Federal Court of Appeal case of Sukhwart Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1983] 2 F.C. 347 (F.C.A.). In that case, the court held that section 7
of the Charter only applies to the deprivation of rights by Canadian officials applying Canadian
law and not to the deprivation of such rights by the fugitive's own country. Id; see Schmidt,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. at 522.
131. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 530.
132. See id This position is strange because the fugitive has not been charged in Canada,
but in the foreign state. Justice Wilson had reservations about Justice Lamer's opinion on this
point. See id at 535.
133. See idt at 531. It should be noted that Justice Wilson actually used the term "Canadian citizen" rather than "fugitive," but it is possible that this was because the fugitive, Susan
Schmidt, was a Canadian citizen.
134. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
135. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 532. It cannot be overlooked that Justice Wilson
took a contrary approach in Sukhwart Singh, [1983] 2 F.C. 347 (F.C.A.). Although she did
not specifically state that she disagreed with the validity of the majority's opinion in that case,
Justice Rouleau has described Justice Wilson's view as being "at odds with that adopted by the
latter, and thus must be considered to strongly imply that the passage quoted can no longer be
considered to be good law." See Kindler v. MacDonald, [1985] 1 F.C. 676, 701 (F.C.T.D.).
136. United States-Canada Extradition Treaty, supra note 37.
137. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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grounds for judicial review.
Justice Wilson reasoned in Schmidt that a fugitive does not plead
the Charter sections "as a defence in the projected trial [in the foreign
state], but as a defence to the extradition court's grant of an order
.... [The] argument in a nutshell is that the extradition court would
' 138
be violating [the Charter] if it made such an order."
Apparently, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada view
the Charter's scope differently. Justice La Forest will only apply
Charter rights to criminal prosecutions in Canada. 139 In his view, the
courts should only apply the Charter to prevent extradition in exceptional cases. 1 40 To him, the issue is whether the "shocking of the conscience" element of section 7 is met in cases where the potential
penalty in the foreign state is one that has been abolished in Canada
or can be classified as cruel and unusual punishment. 141
Justices Wilson and Lamer clearly take a different view from Justice La Forest, although for different reasons. Based on Harbhajan
Singh 142 and Schmidt, 43 Justice Wilson apparently disagrees with
Justice La Forest's reasoning that certain Charter provisions do not
apply simply because the extradition process is not a criminal prosecution in Canada. In Justice Wilson's opinion, the Charter does apply, not as an extraterritorial application, but because it must be given
effect in Canada. In her view, the extradition process must conform
with the section 7 requirement of fundamental justice for "everyone,"
and the potential extraditee is classifiable as "everyone" under section
7. Justice Wilson has eloquently explained the intraterritorial scope
of the Charter in this way:
The effect is right here in Canada, in the Canadian proceedings,
although it will, of course, have repercussions abroad .... If the
participation of a Canadian court or the Canadian Government is
required in order to facilitate extradition so that suspected
criminals may be brought to justice in other countries, it seems to
me that we must face up to the question whether such persons have
the benefit of the Charter or not in the Canadianproceedings.,"
138. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 531.
139. See id. at 500 (concerning sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter); Argentina v. Mellino,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 (concerning sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter); United States v. Allard,
(1987] 1 S.C.R. 465 (concerning sections 7 and 1 l(b) of the Charter).
140. See, e.g., Altun v. Germany, 5 E.H.R.R. 611 (1983).
141. See Smith v. R., 40 D.L.R.4th 435, 436 (1987) (S.C.C.).
142. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
143. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
144. Id at 532-33.
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Arguably, the better view is that the Charter does apply to extradition proceedings, and courts should allow fugitives to plead it.145
The next part of this Article analyzes the central issue of whether a
fugitive may successfully raise sections 12 and 7 of the Charter in the
death sentence context. This Article suggests that Justice Wilson's
analysis regarding the general applicability of the Charter to extradition cases, combined with a section by section analysis of whether
certain sections apply subject to section 1, is preferable.
3.

Section 12

The Soering case provides an interesting approach to the question of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. In that case, the

European Court of Human Rights considered article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which deals with inhuman and
degrading treatment, and found that "an individual may not be surrendered out of the protective zone of the Convention without the
certainty that the safeguards which he would enjoy are as effective as
the Convention standard.""
The United Kingdom argued that article 3 did not apply to acts
occurring outside of its territorial jurisdiction. In particular, it argued
that the court would strain the language of article 3 intolerably if it
held that, by surrendering a fugitive, the extraditing state has "subjected" him or her to any treatment or punishment in the receiving
state.
The United Kingdom also argued that an extension of article 3 to
the matters at issue in Soering would conflict with the norms of international judicial process, in that it would involve adjudication of the
internal affairs of states that are not parties to the Convention and/or
145. However, this could depend on which sections are utilized. Some provisions, such as
section 11 (b) dealing with delay, would be difficult to justify as applicable when the only delay
is that of a foreign authority. But cf Argentina v. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 559 (Lamer J.)
(holding that in a preliminary inquiry in Canada, section 11(b) would apply). Section 11 deals
with delay caused by Canadian authorities. Id. at 561. Justice Wilson confronted this issue in
Mellino when she stated that applying section 11(b) would interfere with international comity,
as Canadian courts cannot demand reasons for a delay from a foreign government. Id. She
reasoned that:
[A]n assessment of the reasonableness or otherwise of a delay presupposes the right
to demand an explanation for it. If this right is not there, no assessment can be
made. It cannot be determined whether the foreign delay was reasonable or not.
That delay cannot therefore be considered under s. Il(b).
Id. This type of analysis is particularly appropriate to the question of whether section 12
applies directly to extradition.
146. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 82 (1989).
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proceedings before the institutions of the Council of Europe. Additionally, the United Kingdom argued that such an application would
entail grave difficulties in evaluation and proof regarding the legal
system and the conditions of treatment and punishment in the requesting state. Finally, the United Kingdom argued that there would
be a serious risk of harm to the contracting state, which "is obliged to
harbour the protected person, and leaves criminals untried, at large
' 47
and unpunished.'
The European Court of Human Rights held that "the Convention does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it
purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose
Convention standards in other states."' 48 However, the court went on
to state that "[t]hese considerations cannot absolve the Contracting
Parties from responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable
49
consequences of extradition suffered outside theirjurisdiction.'
Just as the European Court in Soering held that in interpreting
the European Convention, "regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms,"' 150 one can say that the Canadian Charter of
Rights guarantees similar rights and freedoms in Canada. Courts
must interpret and apply both the Convention and the Charter so as
to make their safeguards practical and effective.' 1'
The European Court stated that the Convention institutions usually do not consider potential violations of the Convention. However,
there is an exception when extradition will violate article 3 by reason
of foreseeable consequences in the foreign state. After all, once the
person is extradited, there is no going back.
The central issue here is whether the potential imposition or carrying out of the death penalty in a foreign state is a violation of the
right not to be subjected to cruel or unusual treatment or punishment.
This is an extremely difficult question. In Soering, the European
Court did not address whether the death sentence per se violated this
147. Id.
83.
148. Id.
86(1).
86(3) (emphasis added). Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of
149. Id.
Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073,
1092 (1990) takes the view that this is a negative duty contingent upon the assessment of
likelihood of damage.
150. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 87 (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 1 239 (1978)). Note also The Netherlands v. Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990).
151. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 87.
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right. Rather, the court viewed the fugitive's subjection to the socalled "death-row phenomenon" as the applicable question. The
court was of the view that, under the terms of the Convention, there
can be no exceptions made to article 3, and that no derogation is permissible in time of war or national emergency under article 15.152
Thus, article 3 "enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe." 153 Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 4 tO which

Canada is a party, and article 5(2) of the American Convention on
Human Rights' 5 5 also guarantee this right. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 156 which Canada ratified in 1987, offers the
same guarantee.
To determine whether a potential punishment violates the fundamental right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, it is
necessary to look at each case on an individual basis. Both the European Convention and the Canadian Charter strive for a balance between the interests of the community and the rights of the individual.
In each case, it is necessary to consider the ramifications of nonextradition and whether it is in the interests of justice to obtain the fugitive via extradition. 157 Courts must take these factors into account,
for inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment or punishment cannot be
looked at in a vacuum.
In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights concentrated
on whether Soering risked being sentenced to death if he was
extradited to Virginia. Following an affirmative answer to that question, the court declared that the actual source of the inhuman or degrading punishment was Soering's subjection to the "death row
phenomenon."
152. Id.
88.
153. Id.
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
172 [hereinafter International Covenant]. Cf.id.art. 6(2) (regarding the death sentence); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 G.A. Res. 217 (III), 2 U.N. GAOR 135, U.N. Dec.
A/810 at 71.
155. O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.I, Doec. 65, Rev. 1, CORR. 2, Jan. 7,
1970 [hereinafter American Convention].
156. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 23 U.N. GAOR 395. Canada ratified this convention on June
24, 1987 and amended its criminal code at section 245.4 to ensure compliance. See MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP CANADA, OUTLAWING AN ANCIENT EVIL: TORTURE

(1989).
157.

Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.

89.
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Any discussion of what constitutes cruel or unusual treatment or
punishment must occur within certain parameters. Specifically, there
must be established a threshhold level of the severity of the treatment.
In Soering, the court stated that its assessment of the minimum level
depends on all the circumstances of the case. These circumstances
include the context and nature of the punishment, the manner and
method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects,
and, in certain cases, the age and mental health of the person, 58 all of
which taken together, would constitute cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment. However, it must be understood that capital punishment is not prohibited under the European Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the American
Convention on Human Rights.159 This is clearly the reason that Soering did not argue that the death penalty itself violates article 3. The
European Court of Human Rights was satisfied that although article
3 does not prohibit the death penalty, subsequent practice in national
penal policy could establish the state parties' agreement to abrogate
the exception in article 2(1), and thus remove the limitation on article
3.160

Protocol 6 to the European Convention does just this, in providing for the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace. 16 1 It came
into force in March 1985, and thirteen states, not including the
United Kingdom, have ratified the protocol. It should also be noted
158.

Id.

100. See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)

162

29-30 (1978).
(1976); Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
159. See European Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(1); International Covenant, supra
note 154, art. 6; American Convention, supra note 155, arts. 4(2), (3). Note, however, that the

Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant expressed its opinion that the
ultimate aim of the International Covenant was to abolish the death penalty. See Bossuyt, The
Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, Elaborationof a Second Protocol
to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death

Penalty, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
the Protection of Minorities, ECOSOC Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20, at 6 (1987) [hereinafter
Bossuyt]. For an account of the death penalty in general, see id.; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
WHEN THE STATE KILLS

(1989);

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY

(1987);

see also Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Capital Punishment,
ECOSOC Doc. E/1985/43 (1985).
160. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. This interpretation would nullify article 2(1), and would
not read the convention as a whole, harmonizing its provisions. See Klass v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 68 (1978).
161. E.T.S. No. 14. Note that in The Netherlands v. Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990), the
Netherlands had ratified Protocol 6. Note also the concurring opinion of Judge de Meyer in
Soering, where he held that the death penalty does not per se violate European human rights
law.
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that a narrow United Nations General Assembly vote in December
1989 adopted a Second Optional Protocol to the International Cove16 2
nant aimed at abolishing the death penalty, except during wartime.
A 1990 Protocol to the American Convention included similar provisions. 163 However, because Protocol 6 and the Covenant amendment
can only obligate those ratifying states, they cannot be interpreted as
generally applying to all states.
Thus, under the European Convention, American Convention,
and International Covenant systems, the death penalty is not prohibited. This does not mean, however, that individuals cannot raise the
provisions on cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment. The answer lies in, among other things, how the sentence is to be imposed or
executed, the sentence's proportionality to the crime committed, and
the conditions of detention before sentence execution.
In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights held that,
based on the particular facts of the case, the United Kingdom's decision to return Soering to the United States, where he would face the
"death-row phenomenon," violated article 3.1 64 Soering had argued
that: he would be exposed to increasing tension and psychological
trauma because of delays in appeal and review procedures in Virginia;
his life and mental state would not necessarily be taken into account
by the judge or jury in determining his sentence; on "death row" he
would become a victim of violence and sexual abuse because of his
age, color, and nationality; and he would suffer from the constant
threat of the death sentence being carried out.
Additionally, Soering claimed that he would not oppose deportation or extradition to the Federal Republic of Germany, where the
death penalty had been abolished. He argued that the refusal of the
United Kingdom to allow such a deportation or extradition accentuated the disproportionality of the Secretary of State's decision. The
United Kingdom viewed this alternative destination as immaterial
162. G.A. Res. 44/128, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990), approved Dec. 15, 1989, by a
vote of 59 to 26, with 48 abstentions. It will come into force upon ratification by 10 states.
Canada voted in favor of the amendment, but has not yet signed, ratified, or acceded. See also
Bossuyt, supra note 159, at 27, where he lists the replies of abolitionist states to the then
proposed Second Optional Protocol. Canada is said to have believed in the merit of the protocol and "[tjhere was no doubt that the United Nations would be honoring human dignity by
enshrining the principle of abolition of the death penalty in an international instrument." See
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
88, 137.
163. Adopted by O.A.S. General Assembly by Res. 1042 of June 8, 1990, reprintedin 29
I.L.M. 1447 (1990).
164. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 105.
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and that consideration of it would lead to a double standard whereby
a fugitive with an alternate destination would have European Convention protection, but others would not. 65 The court found the United
Kingdom's argument to have weight, but it concluded that sending
Soering to Germany would remove the danger of his avoiding prosecution and punishment and would protect him from the "intense and
protracted suffering on death row."' 66 Accordingly, the court held
that the alternative destination was an important factor in its balancing of interests and in the proportionality of the United Kingdom's
extradition decision. 167 For these reasons, the European Court unanimously concluded that the United Kingdom's extradition of Soering
to the United States would expose Soering to a risk that would exceed
the limitations of article 3.
Although Canada is not bound by the European Convention, the
United Kingdom's concerns in Soering are similar to those of Canada
in Ng and Kindler. The Soering decision is therefore instructive to the
Supreme Court of Canada. Soering, however, should be distinguished
from Kindler and Ng because Canada has no alternative destination to
which it can send the fugitives. There are no other states that claim a
legitimate basis of jurisdiction over the fugitives' offenses or that seek
their extradition. Canada itself cannot prosecute them because their
offenses were committed in toto outside of Canada, and they do not
fall within any exceptions for extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction contained in the Canadian Criminal Code. Thus, in weighing the relevant factors as the European Court of Human Rights did, the
Supreme Court of Canada must give great weight to the lack of an
alternate destination in determining the proportionality and reasonableness of the Minister of Justice's decision.
Of the two cases, only Kindler has offered analysis on section 12
of the Charter. Following the Minister of Justice's decision to extradite without seeking assurances on January 17, 1986, Kindler applied
under section 18 of the Federal Court Act 168 for review of the decision
by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The trial division dismissed the
application, holding, inter alia, that the question whether the death
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment could not be ruled
on at that point.' 69 In a subsequent appeal, the Appeal Division dealt
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. I110.
Id.
Id.
R.S.C. ch. F-7, § 18 (1985).
See Kindler v. Crosbie, [1987] 2 F.C. 145 (F.C.T.D.).
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with two issues: the scope of section 12 and whether the death penalty
per se constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.1 70 Justice Pratte
concluded:
I find it impossible to say that the death penalty is, in itself, a cruel
and unusual punishment that is forbidden by section 12 of the
Charter .... [S]ection 12 ' . . limits the freedom of action of
Canadian authorities but does not govern the actions of foreign
countries. In deciding to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country
for trial and punishment in accordance with its laws for an offence
committed there, the Canadian Minister of Justice cannot be said,
in my view, to subject the fugitive to any cruel and unusual punish17
ment or treatment. 1
Interestingly, Justice Pratte further provided that this would be the
case even if the fugitive could be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, because a foreign state rather than Canada would be impos72
ing the objectionable punishment.
Justice Marceau agreed with Justice Pratte in denying the appeal
and held that "it cannot be said that capital punishment, however
imposed and for whatever crime, is inevitably cruel and unusual
within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter."'' 73 In his opinion,
Justice Marceau referred to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision
in Miller v. The Queen 174 in which the court held that Canada's previously existing death penalty provision did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of paragraph 2(b) of the Canadian
Bill of Rights.' 75 Cogently explaining the basic notion of cruel and
unusual punishment, he stated:
[A] punishment may be cruel and unusual, either because the unnecessary infliction of pain or degradation it involves makes it inherently and absolutely so, or else because its disproportion to the
gravity of the crime committed makes it become so. Capital punishment is not more inherently cruel and unusual today then it was
170. Kindler v. Crosbie, [1989] 2 F.C. 492 (F.C.A.).
171. Id. at 498-99.
172. See id. at 499. This latter statement is contrary to Justice La Forest's view as expressed in Schmidt and Mellino, because the nature of the foreign state's criminal penalties
may shock the conscience or be unacceptable, and therefore be tied into section 7 of the Charter. Regardless, Justice Pratte's holding that the death sentence does not violate section 12 of
the Charter is the important segment of his opinion.
173. Id. at 500.
174. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680.
175. See Kindler, [1989] 2 F.C. at 500-01 (construing Canadian Bill of Rights, Appendix
III, § 2(b) (1970)).
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twelve years ago: there is no more unavoidable infliction of pain
involved. And I do not think that society's standards of decency
have evolved in the interim to the point where capital punishment
would now appear disproportionate76to the gravity of any crime,
however revolting and outrageous. 1
Justice Marceau's opinion also referred to the House of Commons' recent vote on June 29, 1987, on the reinstatement of Canada's
death penalty, which had been abolished in 1976.177 The vote was 148

against reinstatement to 127 in favor. 178 Justice Marceau did not take
this majority vote to mean, however, that society views capital punishment as "an outrage to the public conscience or as a degradation to
human dignity.' 1

79

Rather, his view was that the taking of the vote

attested to the contrary. 8 0 To him, the majority vote showed that the
death penalty went beyond what was necessary to achieve the goals
sought by criminal punishment in Canada, and that possible alterna18
tives existed.

1

Justices Pratte and Marceau both dealt with the death sentence
82
per se and did not address the death-row phenomenon question.
However, it is submitted that the death penalty is a more difficult
issue and was the one the European Court did not address. Justice
Marceau acknowledged that the way a sentence is carried out, or its
disproportionality to the crime involved, may render a death sentence,
in certain cases, contrary "to our notions of decency and therefore in
83
direct conflict with the prescriptions of the Charter."'1
Justice Hugessen, dissenting, took an approach that was similar
to that of Justice Wilson in Schmidt regarding the application of the
Charter. He held that extradition involves the application of Canadian law with treaties forming an integral part of domestic Canadian
law.' 8 4 Thus, the Canadian government and the courts cannot "turn
176. Id. Note that in Smith v. The Queen, 34 C.C.C.3d 97 (1987), Justice Lamer held that
section 12 is only concerned with the effect of a punishment, and the process by which it is
imposed is not of great relevance. Id. at 141.
177. See Kindler, [1989] 2 F.C. at 501. The death penalty had not been used since 1962.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 500-01.
180. Id. at 501.
181. Id.
182. See Kindler, [1989] 2 F.C. at 492. Note that the Privy Council addressed the matter
of delay in executing the death penalty in Abbott v. Attorney General for Trinidad & Tobago,
[1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342 and Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 557, 3 All
E.R. 469. See also D. PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY ch. 4 (1982).

183.
184.

Kindler, [1989] 2 F.C. at 502.
Id. at 506.
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a blind eye to what is going to happen once the fugitive is surrendered."' 8 5 With respect to section 12, he was of the opinion that contemporary Canadian society views the death penalty as

unacceptable. 186
It is worthwhile to note that in 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Smith v. The Queen, 187 struck down the Narcotic Control
Act's'8 8 seven-year minimum term of imprisonment for importing
narcotics, as violative of section 12 of the Charter. 8 9 The court
viewed the term as qualitatively acceptable, but quantitatively grossly
disproportionate. Justice Lamer, with the other justices concurring
on this issue, made it clear that some categories of punishment are
unacceptable because they will "outrage [our] standards of decency." 190 The criteria enunciated by Justice Lamer may prelude his
analysis of the death penalty/extradition matter:
[T]he determination of whether the punishment is necessary to
achieve a valid penal purpose, whether it is founded on recognized
sentencing principles, and whether there exist valid alternatives to
the punishment imposed, are all guidelines which, without being
determinative in themselves, help to assess whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate. 19 1
In Kindler, Justice Hugessen concluded that the only penal purpose served by the death penalty was the incapacitation of the executed criminal. He found this to be as unacceptable as some states'
practice of cutting off a thief's hand. Thus, his position was that because a valid and acceptable alternative exists-presumably, assurances being given-the death sentence has no merit and is grossly
disproportionate.
The United States has dealt with the death penalty issue in nu185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 508.

187.

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.

188. R.S.C. ch. N-1, § 5(2) (1970).
189. See Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 1081.
190. Id. at 1073-74. Justice Lamer referred to corporal punishment, lobotomization, and
castration as examples. Id. at 1074.
191. Id. The basis for this type of balancing can be found in Justice McIntyre's dissent in
R. v. Miller & Cockriell, 63 D.L.R.3d 193 (B.C.C.A. 1975), in which he stated that imposing a
sentence with no value was impermissible because it neither protected society by deterring
criminal behavior nor served any other social purpose. See also Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at
1082. Such a punishment, in Justice McIntyre's view, would be cruel and unusual. He believed that capital punishment was not justified by any deterrent effect, and that "it would be

cruel and unusual to impose the ultimate penalty on the mere chance that it may have a
deterrent effect." Miller & Cockriell, 63 D.L.R.3d at 193.
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merous cases. In Gregg v. Georgia,1 92 the United States Supreme

Court held that the death penalty did not per se constitute cruel and
unusual punishment contrary to the eighth amendment of the United

3
States Constitution. More recently, in South Carolina v. Gathers,19

the Court held that, for the purposes of imposing the death penalty, a
court must tailor the defendant's punishment to his or her personal
responsibility and moral guilt.' 94
The Supreme Court of Canada will have to decide whether
courts can apply section 12 directly or in conjunction with section 7 in
death sentence/extradition cases. If it finds that courts can apply section 12 directly, the court must also decide whether the death penalty
is cruel and unusual per se, and whether a convicted person's wait on
death row for an undetermined period of time, with all of its psychological and physical ramifications, in and of itself constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment or treatment. 95 It is submitted that the
death row phenomenon argument, which results from delay in execution, must be read in light of the fact that it occurs because the convicted person has extensive rights of review.
If the court finds section 12 directly applicable and prima facie
violated by a future imposition of the death sentence, then according
to Smith, it will be on account of gross disproportionality.96 When a
Charter right is violated, the authority in question has the burden "to
salvage the legislative provision."' 97 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to entertain a detailed analysis of section 1 of the Charter, 98
but suffice to say that the criteria set out by Chief Justice Dickson in
R. v. Oakes 199 must be met in order to discharge this burden. The
objective must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the
192.

428 U.S. 156 (1976). Thirty-seven states in the United States permit capital punish-

ment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). See also Bassiouni, Lahey & Sang, La Peine de mort aux Etats-Unis-L'etatde la
question en 1972, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET LE DROIT COMPARE 24 (1973).
193. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
194. Id. at 810 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
195. Undoubtedly, the requesting state will argue that because any possible cruel or unusual treatment or punishment will occur outside of Canada, section 12 does not apply. However, this argument conflicts with the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Soering.

196. See Richmond v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1990).
197. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 1079.
198. For such an analysis by this author, see Castel & Williams, supra note 77. Section 1
provides: "The Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 1079.

199.

[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138.
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Charter right. Clearly, the Canadian Supreme Court has already recognized this with respect to extradition in United States v. Cotroni.2°°
However, a party invoking section 1 must show proportionality between the measures adopted and the objective in question. That party
must also show that the means impair "as little as possible" the right
or freedom, and that the effects of the measures and the objective are
proportionate.
It should be noted that Justices Le Dain and McIntyre held in
Smith that once section 12 is prima facie violated, it cannot be saved
by section 1. This was also the approach in Justice Hugessen's dissent
in Kindler.20° It is this author's opinion that this view of the absolute
nature of section 12 is in error. There is no nonderogation provision
in the Charter. The rights contained in the Charter are not absolute,
but are to be evaluated in light of section 1.
If, however, the Supreme Court of Canada decides that section
12 is not directly applicable because the treatment and punishment
will occur abroad, section 12 will still be relevant to the court's analysis of section 7 of the Charter. In R. v. Herbert,20 2 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that "the scope of a fundamental principle of justice
under s. 7 cannot be defined without reference to the other rights
enunciated in [the portion of the Charter dealing with legal
203
rights].,
4.

Section 7

The extradition cases decided since the enactment of the Charter
show that the decision of the Minister of Justice to surrender a fugitive must conform with section 7, and thus, the principles of fundamental justice.2°4 This raises the issue of whether the Minister of
Justice acts reasonably when he or she does not ask for assurances or
accepts insufficient assurances as to the death penalty. In both Kindler and Ng, the Minister of Justice did not ask for assurances. Is this
in keeping with the principles of fundamental justice?
Section 7 implies that life, liberty, and security of the person are
rights that may be derogated if such is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Thus, section 7 does not automatically
200. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
201. [1989] 2 F.C. 492, 504.
202. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
203. Id. at 176. See also In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 502.
204. See, e.g., Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 500; Mellino, 33 C.C.C.3d at 334; Allard &
Charette, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 564.
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prohibit extradition to a state that retains the death penalty. In assessing whether the Minister of Justice has complied with the principles of fundamental justice in extraditing without seeking assurances,
the Supreme Court of Canada will look at three interrelated issues.
First, the court must decide what standard it should use to determine
whether the Minister of Justice acted fairly and reasonably in exercising his or her discretion. Second, if the Minister of Justice decides
that section 12 prima facie violates section 7, the court must decide if
extradition will result in a breach of the principles of fundamental
justice. Third, in such an event, the court must then decide whether
section 1 nevertheless allows for extradition.
As to the first issue, the Federal Court, Trial Division, held in
Kindler that the Minister of Justice's decision was an administrative
decision involving an exercise of discretion, subject to the requirements of natural justice. 205 Justice Rouleau agreed with the Minister's counsel that "the object of the Extradition Act is to provide for
the return of fugitive offenders to the country in which the offence
was committed ....
The courts have recognized the broad nature of
'20 6
[the Minister's] discretion.
In Kindler, Justice Rouleau adroitly summed up the Minister's
duty to act fairly in his reference to Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk
Regional Board.20 7 In Nicholson, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that one of the essential components of the duty to act fairly
is the disclosure of the grounds upon which an adverse decision is
made. 20 8 Based thereon, Justice Rouleau stated in Kindler that if the
decision required the exercise of discretion, the reasons given should
demonstrate two things: the decision-maker's recognition that a
20 9 It
choice existed and the factors considered in making the choice.
is important to note that Justice Rouleau balanced these requirements
against the practical notion that it would be an unjustifiable burden to
require "elaborate and overly-scrupulous reasons." 210 According to
Justice Rouleau, the Minister's decision must fairly and accurately
assess the situation from the perspectives of both the fugitive and the
Canadian people. 211
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

[1987] F.C. 145, 155.
Id. at 156.
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, cited in Kindler v. Crosbie, [1987] 2 F.C. 145, 154.
See id.
Kindler, [1987] 2 F.C. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 155; see also Idziak v. Minister of Justice (No. 2), 53 C.C.C.3d (Ont. H.C.
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The Minister's administrative discretion under article 6 of the
United States-Canada Extradition Treaty is subject to judicial control
over the executive. 2 12 The Minister's discretion only arises after a
court has committed the fugitive for surrender. In order to determine
whether the Minister of Justice has acted lawfully and fairly, a court
must look to the scope and objective of the Extradition Act. 2 13 Justice
Rouleau, in Kindler, held that "in the absence of a blatant error in law
going to jurisdiction, a court should not review a decision of this na'21 4
ture on its merits.
Concerning article 6, Justice Rouleau stated that "the decision of
the Minister ... is essentially a policy one and the determination of
whether assurances should be sought from the United States is a matter wholly within the Minister's discretion. ' 21 5 He further stated that
the Minister's consideration of Canadian public interests, specifically
the government's wish to discourage fugitives from seeking refuge in
Canada, was a policy decision that did not constitute "an error in
law."' 2 16 This "discouragement" was necessary because of Canada's
basically territorial approach to criminal jurisdiction. Thus, unless the
Canadian government amends the criminal code to allow prosecution
in Canada on bases other than the territorial principle recognized in
R. v. Libman, 21 7 Canada will be in an impossible position. In Kindler,
Justice Rouleau found that the fugitive had "been availed of all the
fairness to which he was entitled. ' 218 In his view, the Minister had
2 19
reached a rational conclusion.
The Federal Court of Appeal has also dealt with this issue. For
instance, Judge Pratte held that section 7's reference to the principles
of fundamental justice does not only apply to rules of procedure.
Thus, a decision consonant with all of the rules of procedure may
nevertheless violate the principles of fundamental justice. The resulting issue is whether the exercise of discretion is fundamentally unjust.
Judge Pratte, referring to the judgment of Justice La Forest in
Schmidt, stated that "a ministerial decision to surrender a fugitive to
1989), aff'd, 72 O.R.2d 480 (Ont. C.A. 1990) (holding that the Kindler standard was correct
and that it was met in the case at bar).
212. See, e.g., Kindler v. Crosbie, [1987] 2 F.C. 145, 155 (F.C.T.D.).
213. Id. at 155-56.
214. Id. at 156.
215. Id. at 157.
216. Id.
217. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (S.C.C.).
218. Kindler, [1987] 2 F.C. at 157.
219. See id.
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a country where he would be tortured would be said to be fundamentally unjust and violate section 7."220 Judge Pratte found that the decision to extradite Kindler was not fundamentally unjust because, as
life is not in
section 7 expressly recognizes, deprivation of the right to
22
itself contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. '
In Kindler, Judge Marceau posited that the duty to seek assurances under article 6 of the Treaty would be a compulsory duty,
rather than a discretionary one, if the death sentence constituted a
cruel and unusual punishment per se under section 12. He also alluded to Allard & Charette,222 a case in which Justice La Forest discussed the courts' Charter right to review the Minister's decision, but
warned that courts should exercise this function with caution. Specifically, Justice La Forest stated that "[o]ur international obligations
are involved here and the executive obviously has the primary responsibility in this area. ' 223 Justice Marceau concluded by assessing the
impact of the Canadian Supreme Court trilogy, and stated that the
court's various references to "caution" and the "pre-eminent position" of the executive mean that:
[F]or the Court to intervene, it does not suffice that the situation
facing the fugitive in his country would not be in full accordance
with the prescriptions of the Charter.... It would be necessary
and be
that the situation "sufficiently shocks the conscience"
"simply unacceptable" . . . regardlessof the Canadian context. 224
Thus, Justice Marceau also concluded that the treaty required
the Minister of Justice to refuse to surrender a fugitive only if the
treatment to which the fugitive was likely to be subjected upon return
was "inherently and absolutely contrary to section 12."225 In all other
situations, the Minister's decision was within his discretion, and his
226
assessment was based on the circumstances of the case.
The major issue that will confront the Supreme Court of Canada
regarding the death sentence is the nature of judicial review of the
Minister of Justice's discretionary power under the Extradition Act
and article 6 of the treaty. Some British cases provide insight into
such review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

[1989] 2 F.C. 492, 498.
See id.
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 572-73.
Id. at 573.
Kindler, [1989] 2 F.C. at 503 (citations omitted).
Id. at 504.
See id.
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Civil Service, 227 Lord Diplock classified three grounds upon which a
court may impugn an administrative decision: illegality, irrationality,
22
and procedural impropriety. 8
According to Lord Diplock, Associated ProvincialPictureHouses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.229 most succinctly articulated the irrationality ground. 230 As applied to extradition matters, the Wednesbury test

is whether a reasonable Minister of Justice could not have ordered the
extradition under such circumstances. A court may inquire whether
the Minister considered all of the relevant factors. 23' In Council of
Civil Service Unions, Lord Diplock stated that the test "applies to a
decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to
''
the question to be decided could have arrived at it. 232
In Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State,233 an immigration case dealing with a claim to asylum, Lord Bridge acknowledged the limitations
of the Wednesbury principles, but stated that the court, in reviewing
an administrative decision, must subject it to the most rigorous examination "to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity
of the issue which the decision determines. ' ' 234 Lord Bridge empha-

sized that "[t]he most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life and, when an administrative decision under
challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk,
the basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious
scrutiny.

235

These English cases clearly indicate that a Minister should not
extradite a fugitive without assurances regarding the nonapplication
of the death penalty, unless the Minister is able to rationalize his or
her decision based on all of the pertinent factors. This view is particularly relevant to an assessment of the extraditions in Ng and Kindler.
227. [1984] 3 All E.R. 935 (H.L.).
228. Id. at 950-51. The British court left open other grounds of judicial review, the most
likely being proportionality. Id. at 950.
229. [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A.).
230. Council of Civil Service Unions, [1984] 3 All E.R. at 951.
231. See Price, Human Rights, Death Row and Administrative Law Remedies, 34 INT'L
CRIM. L.Q. 162 (1985).
232. [1984] 3 All E.R. at 951.
233. [1987] 1 All E.R. 940.
234. Id. at 952.
235. See also id. at 956 (Lord Templeman's similar view). As to judicial review of the
Australian Attorney General's decision to extradite, see Hempel & Etheridge v. A.G., 29 A.
Crim. R. 133 (F.C. 1987).
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The foregoing analysis of section 12 is pertinent to the issue of
whether Canada's extradition of a fugitive to a state that imposes the
death penalty violates the principles of fundamental justice. Even if
section 12 is not directly applicable because the treatment or punishment will occur abroad, it is still relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the decision to extradite, and in analyzing section 7. As this
Article previously indicated, in assessing whether the death penalty
236
constitutes cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, the Smith
case seems particularly helpful. Some of the pertinent questions include: Is the death sentence grossly disproportionate? Additionally,
as Justice La Forest asked in Allard,237 would the fugitive face a to-

tally unacceptable situation in the foreign state; or, as he asked in
Schmidt,238 do the criminal penalties or procedures in the requesting
state sufficiently shock the conscience so as to result in a violation of
section 7? In In re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, 2 39 Justice Lamer held that
the Charter rights contained in sections 8 through 14 "address specific
deprivations of the right to life, liberty and security of the person in
breach of the principles of fundamental justice" and, as such, are violations of section 7.240 If the court categorizes the death penalty as
punishment in accordance with the law of the requesting state, and
not necessarily cruel and unusual, this will constitute a crucial finding
in the court's ultimate decision.
Neither the European Convention nor the International Covenant prohibit the death sentence per se. Rather, both documents only
prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. Only if the court equates
cruel and unusual punishment with the death penalty will there be a
violation of section 7. The Supreme Court of Canada has been willing
to look to these international instruments for assistance in interpreting the Charter. 241 Thus, the distinction in the Covenant between the
prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment in article 7, and the allowance of the death penalty for the most
serious crimes in article 6(2), is important. As to the Covenant itself,
the United Nations Committee on Human Rights concluded that cap236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
[1985] 2 S.C.R.

187-91 and accompanying text.
126-27 and accompanying text.
124-25 and accompanying text.
486.

240. Id. at 502.
241. E.g., Slaight Commission Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056-57; Smith v.
The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; see also W.A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER (1991).
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ital punishment is not a violation of article 6(2) in Pratt& Morgan v.
Jamaica.242 Additionally, the death penalty is not considered to be
"torture" within the definition contained in article 1(1) of the Torture
Convention.
V.

CONCLUSION

The propriety of extraditing a convicted or alleged murderer in a
death penalty case, especially where a prima facie case is readily available, is a difficult issue. However, as this Article demonstrates, several matters require immediate attention. First, it is imperative that
the Minister of Justice exercise his or her discretion to extradite under
section 25 reasonably. From an international cooperation perspective, the need to honor Canada's treaty obligations will necessarily
play a part in the determination. From the Canadian perspective, an
important factor is the lack of an alternative extradition destination
243
for Ng and Kindler. Deportation, too, may prove impossible.
Moreover, the Canadian Criminal Code restricts prosecution in Canada. The Minister's decision to surrender must take into consideration this Canadian context, as well as the public interest and the
circumstances in the requesting state.
If the Supreme Court of Canada holds that extradition is reasonable in cases like Ng and Kindler, the court will, in effect, allow Canada to extradite even when assurances are not given by the requesting
country. If the court does not take this view, Canada has two options.
The first option is to do what the United Kingdom did in Soering
following the European Court's decision. 244 In that case, the United
States agreed to prosecute Soering only on the noncapital charges,
with the result that if the court found him guilty, he would face a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. If the United States truly wants to extradite fugitives for the
purpose of prosecution, this is a possible solution and Canada must
indicate this strongly to the United States. If the United States is
prepared to compromise in this way with some states, why not with
Canada? The second option is for Canada to amend its Criminal
Code to provide for Canada's prosecution of capital cases in which
242. Communications Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987 (6 April 1989) in Report of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. General Assembly, Off. Rec. 44th Session, Supp. No. (A/44/
40) at 231, 215.
243. Certainly, this would be true in a case where the fugitive is a Canadian citizen.
244. This compromise also occurred in the Short case, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990).
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extradition is not possible. Regardless of an individual's moral or religious stance on the death penalty, either of these solutions would
prove acceptable.
A dangerous option to both individual human rights and state
sovereignty remains: the forcible return of the fugitive by illegal
means. 245 If extradition becomes impossible, Canada may see an increase in kidnappings and forcible returns of fugitives to the United
States. 246 This possibility is far from remote. Recently, United States
law enforcement officers and private bounty hunters have operated
beyond the United States borders. Additionally, United States courts
24 7
have refused to relinquish jurisdiction over the trial of such cases.
This is not an acceptable situation, as it violates both -state sovereignty
and individual civil liberties. It must be prevented from becoming an
increasingly used alternative to extradition.
245. See Williams, CriminalLaw-Jurisdiction-IllegalArrest-Due Process- Violation of
InternationalLaw, 53 CAN. B. REV. 404 (1975); Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of InternationalLaw in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY

(Y. Dinstein 1989), reprintedin F.A.

MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL

339 (1990); Lowenfeld, US. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990); Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Government
Order: A Follow Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989); Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); Matta-Ballasteros
ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988).
246. See Van den Wyngaert, Applying Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box?, REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL (forthcoming).
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